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This paper assesses the extent to which social contacts and ethnic concentration affect 
the education-occupation mismatch of natives and immigrants. Using Australian 
panel data and employing a dynamic random effects probit model, we show that 
social capital exacerbates the incidence of over-education, particularly for females. 
Furthermore, for the foreign-born, ethnic concentration significantly increases the 
incidence of over-education. Using an alternative index, we also show that social 
participation, friends and support and ethnic concentration are the main contributors 
in generating a mismatch, while reciprocity and trust does not seem to have any effect 
on over-education for both, immigrants and natives. Finally, we show that social 
networks are more beneficial for the relatively better educated.  
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Individuals seeking employment use a variety of different job search methods to enter 
the labour market. These include contacting employment agencies, searching through 
newspaper or website advertisements, approaching employers directly and, most 
importantly, using personal networks such as friends and relatives. Considerable 
research has been conducted on the significance of the role personal networks (or 
social capital) play on an individualÕs labour market outcome, as these networks 
provide them with useful information about the job market and improve their chances 
in finding employment. 
Social capital is generally defined as the social relations and social networks of 
individuals, which can be characterised by norms of trust and reciprocity leading to 
outcomes of mutual benefit (Bourdieu 1993; Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993).
1
 
Although a large body of theoretical and empirical work shows that social contacts 
could help individuals enter the labour market,
2
 there is limited research that focuses 
on what type of jobs individuals get. More precisely, friends and relatives may play a 
significant role in helping individuals find employment, but it does not necessarily 
mean that the job found through social networks matches an individualÕs education 
level.    
When analysing the labour market performance of job seekers, a common problem 
emphasised in the literature is the existence of education-occupation mismatch. This 
phenomenon has been widely studied in the literature emphasising on the 
determinants as well as the consequences of mismatch and the importance of the 
potential wage loss individuals experience in the labour market (see Hartog, 2000; 
McGuinness, 2006; Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011; Piracha and Vadean, 2013; 
Nielsen, 2011). However, limited research exists assessing the link between social 
capital and over-education.  
Social capital can either reduce the possibility of labour market mismatch or it could 
possibly accentuate the effect. On the one hand, social capital, much like human 
capital, plays an important role in the labour market and could help individuals obtain 
																																								 																					
1
 For a general discussion, see Winter (2000). 
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 See for instance, Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004, 2007), Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2005), 
Wahba and Zenou (2005). 
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employment that matches their qualifications. On the other hand, however, it may 
only provide an imperfect, and perhaps temporary, solution for job seekers to avoid 
the ÔstigmaÕ of unemployment. For instance, if individuals have remained 
unemployed for a long period of time and experience financial difficulties, they are 
likely to accept jobs that require a lower level of education than the one formally 
obtained. In that case, even if social capital makes a positive contribution in 
facilitating access to the labour market, it may in fact generate a mismatch. 
Using data from the Households Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA), 
we analyse whether social capital can help the job seekers Ð natives and immigrants Ð 
in finding an occupation that matches their level of education.
3
 The HILDA survey 
provides rich information about individualsÕ dynamics of employment status and 
education level as well as questions related to social networks and social relations in 
Australia. We capture social capital by utilising two different methods. The first one 
is an index, constructed using principal component analysis (PCA), of several aspects 
of social capital including amount of support, frequency of contact with friends and 
family, feeling part of the community and social participation. The second, 
Òalternative measureÓ uses three separate indices Ð Ôsocial participationÕ, Ôreciprocity 
and trustÕ and Ôfriends and supportÕ. The idea of the alternative measure is to assess 
the sensitivity among different ÔtypesÕ of networks. Finally, for the immigrant sample 
only, we also consider the role of ethnic concentration. 
Panel data estimation techniques are used to examine the dynamics of mismatch 
(over- and under-education) as well as the causal effect of social capital on the 
incidence of a possible mismatch, controlling for state dependence, initial conditions 
problem and unobserved individual heterogeneity. In addition, Mundlak corrections 
have been used in order to control for unobserved time-invariant individual 
heterogeneity of the variables of interest. The results show that social capital has a 
statistically significant and positive effect on the probability of being over-educated, 
i.e., it exacerbates the incidence of over-education, while no significant effect of 
social capital is observed on the incidence of being under-educated.  In addition, 
immigrants experience worse labour market outcomes when residing in regions with 
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to be overeducated than the natives and the difference is more pronounced for those coming from non-
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higher proportions of ethnic concentration. Significant gender differences are also 
observed where social capital and ethnic concentration appear to worsen the mismatch 
for females, while no effect is observed for the male sample. When using alternative 
measures of social capital and distinguishing between levels of education, the results 
suggest that social participation and friends and support are likely to act as important 
contributors in reducing over-education for the relatively more educated, while those 
with lower levels of education do not seem to benefit from their contacts.  
2. Social capital and the labour market 
The quality and structure of social networks have been widely recognised to play a 
significant role for the achievement of specific economic outcomes in the labour 
market. A number of studies have found that social networks can lead to economic 
opportunities, efficient transactions and ultimately to economic growth as they allow 
people to Ôleverage on resourcesÕ such as knowledge and information of members in 
the network (Lin, 1999; Mouw 2003; Ioannides and Loury, 2004). The positive role 
of social capital on individualsÕ labour market outcomes has been the subject of 
considerable research, with a growing interest by economists to study the impact of 
social networks on labour market outcomes in terms of employment entry and wages.
4
 
Several factors have been proposed in the literature that are linked to social capital 
such as social and civic participation, social networks and social support, reciprocity 
and trust as well as subjective views about the locale where one lives. The three main 
aspects of social capital commonly referred to in the literature are ÔbondingÕ 
ÔbridgingÕ and ÔlinkingÕ (Putnam, 2000). ÔBondingÕ refers to social contacts with close 
friends and relatives while ÔbridgingÕ refers to casual contacts such as colleagues and 
more distant friends. Finally, ÔlinkingÕ refers to the interaction people have with 
others through social participation and memberships of a club or association, 
voluntary activities as well as the participation of political and educational 
organisations. One key finding in the literature is that ÔweakÕ ties have a more 
significant impact on finding a better job than do ÔstrongÕ ties. Strong ties are 
associated with social contacts and resources within an individualÕs own network 
(Barbieri 2000; Lin 1999), while weak ties are classified as contacts individuals have 
in networks that are distant from the individualÕs own network (e.g., individuals living 
																																								 																					
4




in rural areas having contacts with persons living in cities). The benefit from more 
distant network comes from the fact that one has access to information and resources 
not available within oneÕs own network.
5
 For instance, using a theoretical model, 
Granovetter (1973) argues that weak ties increase individualsÕ economic outcomes as 
they provide them with information and resources of the distant network. 
The role social capital plays on individualsÕ employment prospects and wages has 
been studied in a number of settings. For instance, Bentolila et al (20010) argued that 
social capital may only help individuals in finding jobs in specific occupations rather 
than the ones in which they are more productive. Using data from the US and Europe, 
they found that although social contacts decrease unemployment duration by 1-3 
months, they also reduce wages by at least 2.5%. The argument put forward by the 
authors is that higher status occupations are more difficult to find. Thus, individuals 
with social contacts are more willing to take up employment in a lower paid 
occupation which generates a mismatch in the labour market. Using the UK Quarterly 
Labour Force Survey, Kucel and Byrne (2008) estimated the effect of job search 
methods on over-education distinguishing between formal channels and social 
contacts. Their results reveal a lower probability of over-education when the job was 
found through formal channels (e.g., job advertisements), while personal contacts 
appear to increase the probability of over-education. However, Franzen and 
Hangartner (2006) get the opposite results. Using 2001 Swiss data they show that 
social networks and direct job application procedures lead to higher status 
occupations compared to formal channels.
6
 Studies focusing on the effect of job 
search methods on graduatesÕ over-education showed that finding a job through the 
universitiesÕ career office reduces the probability of over-education (see Blzquez and 
Mora, 2010; Carroll and Tani, 2014).  
Regarding the role social capital plays on employment outcomes of immigrants, a 
number of studies have shown that having contacts with natives, who are more likely 
to have better information about the host country labour market and employment 
opportunities, has a stronger positive effect on immigrantsÕ labour market outcomes 
compared to those with less/fewer contacts with natives (see Kanas et al, 2012; Hagan 
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1998 and Putnam 2000; Drever and Hoffmeister 2008; Kazemipur 2006). However, 
immigrants who have better contacts with co-ethnic groups may also have a positive 
effect on their employment outcomes, especially if they are hindered by low 
proficiency in the host countryÕs language. Using data on Latino immigrants residing 
in the US, Chavez et al (2008) showed that ethnic concentration (contacts with co-
ethnics) may help immigrants in getting access to information about the host country 
as they are able to communicate in their native language, thus finding better paid jobs. 
However, their results show that the positive effect of ethnic concentration on 
immigrantsÕ wages seemed to be effective only in the short run, as in the long run 
immigrants did not seem to benefit much from their co-ethnic contacts. On the other 
hand Kanas et al (2012), using German Socio-Economic Panel data to study social 
contacts of immigrants in Germany, found no evidence that ethnic concentration can 
improve immigrantsÕ occupational status and wages. Finally, Piracha et al (2016), 
using data from Australia, found that social capital increases immigrantsÕ entry into 
the labour market, especially for women and those employed in white-collar 
occupations, though they found no effect on wages.
7
 
Notwithstanding the vast literature on social networks as well as labour market 
mismatch, none of the existing studies have analysed the effect of social capital on 
immigrantsÕ and nativesÕ over-education, especially using panel data analysis. Cross-
sectional analyses do not allow one to examine the causal relationship between social 
capital and over-education while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. For 
instance, individuals may have fewer contacts due to unobserved characteristics, or 
due to lack of employment over the years or a higher persistence of over-education, 
which is likely to limit their access to social networks (e.g., social interactions with 
co-workers). The contribution of this paper is therefore to analyse the extent to which 
social capital can, if at all, help immigrants and natives in finding a better matched job 
over time and hence attenuate the incidence of being over-educated. 
3. Data and construction of variables 
We use eleven waves (2001-2011) of the HILDA survey data to conduct the analysis.  
HILDA provides information about individualsÕ labour market activities, family 
formation, socio-economic status and their views and satisfaction with life and work.  
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Each wave includes approximately 17,000 individuals who live in Australia and are 
15 years of age or older. One of the key advantages of HILDA is that it provides 
information on an annual basis and enables the use of panel data estimations which 
help to reduce heterogeneity bias arising from single cross-sectional data. One 
common problem with panel data is that individuals may drop out of the survey (e.g., 
emigration from Australia) as well as join the survey at a later wave (e.g., 
immigration to Australia) which leads to an unbalanced panel. In order to reduce the 
bias and skewness arising from such attrition, the HILDA provides longitudinal 
sample weights on a regular basis.
8
  
In order to assess the importance of social capital on employment outcomes, the 
sample is restricted to the working age population (individuals aged between 15 and 
64), who are in paid employment (excluding self-employed) and are not in full time 
education. Within the over-education literature, three main methods have been 
proposed to measure over-education: the job analysis method (JA), worker self-
assessment (WA) and the realised matches method (RM). The job analysis method is 
seen as the objective measure that relies on documents and formal studies by 
countries and organisations, which is therefore often considered the preferred method 
to measure educational mismatch (Rumberger, 1987; Green et al, 2007; Hartog, 
2000). For this study, the job analysis method is therefore used to estimate the 
dependent variable, the probability of being over-educated. 
The HILDA survey covers a wide range of occupational categories based on a 2-digit 
scale taken from the Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ANZSCO). Using these categories, each occupation is matched to the 
required level of education. There are 5 skill levels matched into a specific occupation 
category in the ANZSCO. The occupational breakdown available in the survey and 
their corresponding education level are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix.
9
 In 
addition to the required level of education, having relevant work experience in the 
corresponding occupation may substitute formal education level. Since individuals are 
asked about the years of work experience they have obtained in their current 
occupation (tenure with the same occupation), besides the required level of education, 
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those with relevant work experience have also been classified as being correctly 
matched. The 5 skill levels outlined in ANZSCO and the relevant work experience are 
shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. From the total sample, approximately 17 per cent 
of natives have been classified as over-educated, while a slightly higher proportion of 
immigrants (22 per cent) are over-educated. In addition, a relatively large proportion 
of both natives and immigrants are correctly-matched, as shown in Table 1.  
Since our interest is in the probability of over/under-education of employed 
individuals, the sample has been the restricted to the labour force. Thus, the sample is 
restricted to 56,726 wage employees (45,543 natives and 11,183 immigrants). 
The key interest for the analysis is the effect of different aspects that could be used as 
proxies for social capital. In order to assess the importance of social capital on 
individualsÕ educational mismatch, 8 variables have been chosen which represent 
individualsÕ social networks and contacts from a set of questions asked in the survey 
(summarised in Table A3). However, since these variables are likely to be highly 
correlated to each other, a social capital index has been constructed using the 
principal component analysis (PCA). The construction of the index, the explanation of 
the principal component used as well as the regression outcomes for the variables 
chosen are shown in section A4 in the Appendix. These variables cover individualsÕ 
satisfaction with life, their views about life as well as a number of activities. The 
following variables have been used:  
Amount of support: The following questions were asked regarding the amount of 
support individuals get from other people.  
-! ÔI often need help from other people but canÕt get itÕ 
-! ÔI have no one to lean on in times of troubleÕ 
-! ÔI often feel very lonelyÕ 
-! ÔI seem to have a lot of friendsÕ. 
The response ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Four dummy 
variables have been constructed that equal to one if the response was above average, 
and zero otherwise. This was mainly done since the PCA index is better estimated if 




Frequency of contacts: The following question was asked in HILDA: 
-! ÔIn general, about how often do you get together socially with friends or 
relatives not living with you?Õ  
The response ranges from 1 to 7 (every day, several times a week, about once a week, 
2 or 3 times a month, about once a month, once or twice every 3 months). A dummy 
variable has been created equal to one if the individuals report to socially interact with 
friends and relatives at least twice a month, and zero if contact is less frequent than 
that. Another aspect used as a proxy for social capital is: 
Feeling part of the local community: 
This was asked among a set of questions related to their satisfaction in life. It is 
measured from 0 to 10, where 0 represents totally dissatisfied, 5 represents moderate 
and 10 represents totally satisfied.  A dummy equal to one has been constructed if the 
response was above average, and zero otherwise.  
Social Participation: The following questions were asked as part of this measure.  
-! ÔAre you currently an active member of a sporting, hobby or community-based 
association?Õ  
-! ÔDo you belong to a trade union or employee association?Õ 
Both of these questions were already constructed as dummy variables as the response 
could only be answered with either a ÔyesÕ or a ÔnoÕ.  
Furthermore, another ÔtypeÕ of index has been created that allows the construction of 
three different social capital indices. That is, instead of using all 8 variables into one 
single index using principal components, three indices have been constructed which 
allow to measure different aspects of social capital as a combination.10 The three 
indices created are: Ôreciprocity and trustÕ, Ôfriends and supportÕ and Ôsocial 
participationÕ. The index Ôreciprocity and trustÕ includes three dummy variables: help 
from others (dhelp), having someone to lean on (dsupport) and not feeling lonely 
(dtrust). This index adds one point if respondents receive help from others, one point 
for those who have someone to lean on and one for those who do not feel lonely, and 
																																								 																					
10




ranges from 0 to 3. Similarly, Ôfriends and supportÕ ranges from 0 to 3 and adds one 
point if an individual states to have a lot of friends (dfriends), one additional point if 
they have frequent contacts (dfreq) and one point for feeling part of the local 
community (dcommunity). Finally, the Ôsocial participationÕ index takes one point for 
those participating in clubs and associations (dclub) and one for union members 
(dunion) and ranges from 0 to 2.11 Distinguishing among three indices allows us to 
analyse whether any particular one has a higher/lower impact on over-education. 
Finally, an additional determinant, ethnic concentration, has been used to examine its 
effect on immigrantsÕ incidence of being mismatched in the labour market. Since 
residing in a region with a high concentration of immigrants of the same ethnic group 
increases immigrantsÕ chances of having contacts with co-ethnics such as neighbours 
or friends and relatives living nearby, ethnic concentration is considered to be one 
additional form of social capital. Ethnic concentration is defined as the population of 
a particular ethnic group residing in a specific area over the population of that region 




 *100,                                            (1) 
where subscript i represents a particular ethnic group residing in a specific region j 
and t represents the corresponding time period. In order to construct this variable, 
information on the residence population by country of birth and the Australian Capital 
Territory has been used from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006 and 2011, 
which provides census data on the population across Australia. This variable allows 
us to examine whether contacts with co-ethnics may have a significant effect on 
occupation-education mismatch.
12
 The ethnic concentration variable is based on the 
share of immigrants of the same region who are employed. Since immigrants from the 
same country of origin tend to find employment in the same type of jobs, the ethnic 
concentration variable for the employed sample would allow us to capture any effect 
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due to increased competition for a particular type of job/firm in which immigrants 
from the same country of origin usually cluster. 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables for the employed 
natives and immigrants.  It is noticeable that both groups have an average of 9 and 10 
years work experience, respectively, in their current occupation and 7 years tenure 
with the current employer. In addition, 38 per cent of both natives and immigrants 
have children below 15 years of age living in the household, while 8 per cent of the 
former and 7 per cent of the latter group report to suffer from health problems which 
may affect their work activities. Regarding the immigrant sample, 90 per cent report 
to be fluent in English and have spent an average of 24 years in Australia.
13
  
As regards the countries of birth, 47 per cent originate from English-speaking 
countries
14
, 16 per cent were born in Europe while 28 per cent originate from Asia. 
Immigrants are slightly more educated than natives with 39 per cent having 
completed at least a BachelorÕs degree, while only 28 per cent of natives have the 
same level of education. For both groups, the majority lives in the Australian state of 
New South Wales followed by Victoria. As regards the dummy variables used for 
social capital, a relatively large percentage of both groups have reciprocity and trust 
(receive help from others, have someone to lean on in times of trouble and do not feel 
lonely). Regarding Ôfriends and supportÕ, a relatively large percentage of both groups 
report to have regular contacts with friends and relatives not living in the same 
household as well as feeling part of the local community. Approximately half of the 
population states to have a lot of friends. Looking at the social participation variables, 
38 per cent of natives and 33 per cent of immigrants report to be active members of a 
sporting/hobby or community based club or association, while 29 per cent of natives 
and 27 per cent of immigrants report to be union members of employee associations. 
While in most cases immigrants are similar to natives, the latter group has a slightly 
higher percentage of social contacts than the former. In addition, the average 




 English proficiency includes those who state that English is the only language spoken at home or 
those who report to speak English very well. Approximately 67 per cent report to speak only English at 
home, while 23 per cent of those who do not speak only English report to know the language very well. 




4. Empirical methodology 
The main objective of this paper is to examine the effect of social capital on the 
incidence of over-education for immigrants and natives. When conducting a panel 
data analysis, it is of crucial importance to decide whether the estimation will be 
conducted using random effects or fixed effects. If time-variant control variables have 
little variation over time, the fixed effects estimator would lead to imprecise 
estimation coefficients (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Additionally, in the case of a 
limited dependent variable in short panels like in the HILDA survey (e.g. large cross-
sectional units but few time periods), the fixed effects estimator can lead to problems 
with the degrees of freedom leading to inconsistent estimates of parameters (Maddala, 
1987). 
 
Besides modelling the extent to which social capital could contribute in the reduction 
of or accentuate the incidence of over-education, we also want to estimate the 
dynamics of over-education − the effect of over-education in t-1 on the mismatch at 
time t. We therefore introduce a lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor 
in the model that directly captures the effect of past over-education status on current 
over-education. Given the above discussion, the best way to capture the effect of 
social capital on over-education is to employ a dynamic random effects probit model.  
 
Although the main interest is to model the extent to which social capital could 
contribute to the reduction of or accentuate the incidence of over-education, excluding 
individuals who are under-educated could severely bias the estimated coefficients. We 
have therefore estimated the effects of the incidence of a mismatch by running 
separate regressions for the probability of over-education as well as the probability of 
under-education. This would allow us to analyse whether social contacts have any 
effect on individualsÕ being under-educated (in fact, the same worker could 
experience both types of mismatch over time). 
 
The variable of interest is the incidence of a mismatch (e.g. the probability of being 
over-/under-educated) which is observed by a dummy latent dependent variable :-/
∗  
for any time period t such that 
                                                      :-/ = 1	if		:-/
∗ > 0                                          (2) 
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							:-/ = 0	otherwise 
In order to model the dynamics of a mismatch, the latent dependent variable equation 
can be written in the following form: 
                                   :-/
∗ = γ:-/IJ+ βL-/
M + N- + O-/,    ( i = 1,É, N; t = 2,É, T)    (3) 
where the model is estimated for the time period t ≥ 2. :-/
∗  denotes the latent variable 
for each individual i at time t, :-/IJ  represents the lagged dependent variable, L-/
M  
includes a set of explanatory variables, N- is the time invariant unobserved individual-
specific random effects and O-/  is the error term, where the individual specific 
component of the error term O-/  is uncorrelated with the independent explanatory 
variables L-/ such that O-/~N(0, RS
T), and the composite error term is U-/ = N- +	O-/. 
However, the random effects model makes the assumption that the explanatory 
variables L-/
M  are uncorrelated with N- . If this assumption is violated, it will lead to 
biased and inconsistent parameters. A common solution to this unrealistic assumption 
is to use the Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984) approach which proposes a 
solution to control for any unobserved fixed component of each time variant variable 
in the estimation. Therefore, N-  and L-/
M  are specified parametrically and can be 
incorporated directly in the random effects model such that: 
																																																																						N- = W-, + X-,                                           (4) 
where W- is a vector capturing the time averaged mean values for every time-varying 
covariates and assumes X-~Y(0, RS
T)  where X-  is the residual time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity which is independent of L-/
M  and O-/ . Thus, the random 
effects specification can be used which gives equivalent fixed-effects estimates as the 
means of the time-varying variables are included in the model which capture any 
unobserved time-invariant effects of the explanatory variables. Furthermore, one 
concern regarding the social capital variable could be the non-random distribution of 
social capital amongst those finding a job through it (for instance, endogeneity linked 
to unobserved non-cognitive skills such as social or introvert behaviour). For instance, 
social capital could be a result of different personality traits (e.g. social/introvert 
behaviour) among those looking for a job through social networks. Similarly, for the 
immigrant sample, ethnic concentration is likely to be endogenous if individuals self-
select themselves to reside in specific regions (e.g. selecting to reside in regions with 
14	
	
a high ethnic concentration of their own ethnic group). Thus, if social interactions are 
a result of different social behaviours or self-selection into specific regions of 
individuals seeking employment, the estimates of the relevant variables that capture 
social networks are likely to be over/under estimated. However, since this 
social/introvert personality, as well as the choice to reside in specific areas, are likely 
to be unobserved fixed components of an individual, the Mundlak corrections are 
likely to capture those unobservables (if present), since the corrections are used for 
exactly that purpose.  
Another problem in the dynamic random effects specification arises with the inclusion 
of the lagged dependent variable in the equation. This might be spurious due to 
endogeneity of the initial conditions problem, since the standard random effects 
model assumes the initial condition of the dependent variable to be exogenous 
(Heckman, 1981). However, if the initial condition is correlated with N-, the standard 
random effects probit model would be inconsistent as it would overestimate state 
dependence (Heckman, 1981). Thus, :-/IJ would be correlated with the composite 
error term U-/. Three main methods have been developed to account for the initial 
condition problem (Heckman, 1981; Orme, 2001 and Wooldridge, 2005). Since all 
three estimators have been proven to give similar (if not identical) results, we choose 
the Wooldridge (2005) estimator to conduct the analysis.  
Wooldridge (2005) proposed a Conditional Maximum Likelihood (CML) estimator 
where the distribution is conditional on the initial value of the dependent variable :-J 
and a set of exogenous regressors such that   
&-|:-	-6-/-5^ , _-~Normal(Nd + NJ-6-/-5^ + _-NT, Re
T),                                   (5) 
where 
&- = Nd + NJ:--6-/-5^ + _-NT + N-.                                                               (6) 
Thus, the model can be specified as follows, 
:-/
∗ 	= γ:-/IJ+ L-/
 β+ δ:-J + fW-  + U-/,              ( i = 1,É, N; t = 2,É, T)     (7) 
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where U-/ = g- + O-, :-J is the initial value of the dependent variable, W- are the mean 
values for all time-variant variables that capture any unobserved time-invariant 
characteristics of the time-variant covariates and the rest are as explained above. 
Furthermore, since educational mismatch is only observed for the employed 
individuals, a potential selection bias may occur if the individuals are non-randomly 
selected from the population. However, in the HILDA survey, only 4 per cent of the 
sample is unemployed. Since the percentage of unemployed individuals is relatively 
low, a selection issue would typically not be a major concern. However, in order to 
control for possible selection into employment, the level of education has been 
included as an additional regressor in the over-education equation.  
Although a random effects model with Mundlak corrections controls for omitted 
variables which may be correlated with the explanatory variables, it does not control 
for potential endogeneity of social capital. That is, social networks may be a result of 
shocks which could affect the level of social capital and therefore educational 
mismatch. For instance, the level of social contacts may depend on the accessibility to 
and availability of resources and networks in their region of residence (or working 
area). In order to control for potential endogeneity of social capital and ethnic 
concentration, interaction variables between year of survey and the region of 
residence have been included in all regressions. This allows us to control for potential 
shocks which may affect the level of social capital. 
Another potential identification issue when studying the effect of social networks on 
labour market outcomes is the possible reverse causality. That is, while higher social 
contacts and the interaction with friends and relatives may help individuals to find a 
job that matches their level of education, it could be argued that a higher-status job 
could provide individuals with more resources and enable them to increase their 
social networks (e.g. meeting more people in their work environment, socialise with 
co-workers etc). In fact, in the case of immigrants, it may give them more 
opportunities to form social networks with natives, which could positively affect their 
employment outcome.  
 
There are two ways to control for reverse causality: we could either use an 
instrumental variable model or use lagged variables. Finding an appropriate 
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instrument in these kinds of models, and especially in our data, is almost impossible. 
We therefore follow Kanas et al (2012) and control for potential reverse causality by 
including lagged variables of social contacts, which is a more appropriate method in a 
random effects model. One concern when including the lagged variables is the 
possibility of serial correlation, which may invalidate the results. However, Baltagi 
(2001) and Wooldridge (2002) argue that serial correlation is not an issue when there 
are relatively large number of observations (N) and a small time-period (T), which is 
the case in our data. They explain that in such cases clustering standard errors is 
sufficient to provide consistent estimates.	
5. Results and discussion 
Table 3 presents the results obtained from the dynamic random effects probit model 
(Wooldridge, 2005) with Mundlak corrections controlling for the initial conditions 
problem and unobserved heterogeneity. Columns 1 and 2 present the incidence of 
over/under educated of the total sample, while columns 3-4 and 5-6 report separate 
results for natives and immigrants respectively. 
Since the effect of social networks on labour market outcomes are expected to vary 
according to ethnicity (e.g. native or immigrants) as well as according to gender, the 
main analysis has been conducted separately for natives/immigrants and for 
males/females. Table 4 presents the results obtained for the male sample with separate 
estimates for natives and immigrants, while Table 5 reports the results of the 
incidence of over/under education for the female sample.  
Tables 6, 7 and 8 report the results obtained using the alternative measure of social 
capital, namely Ôsocial participationÕ, Ôreciprocity and trustÕ and Ôfriends and supportÕ 
for males and females separately. Tables 9a-b and 10a-b report the results obtained 
when distinguishing between those who have completed at least a BachelorÕs degree 
and those whose education is below that level. Since different skill levels are likely to 
be affected differently in the labour market, social capital may have different effects 






 In fact, individuals are likely to self-select themselves into specific types of networks according to 




5.1 Dynamics of over-education 
 
Before discussing the role of social capital in determining the incidence of over-
education, we first discuss the dynamics of over-education for both natives and 
immigrants, with a particular focus on state dependence. As Mavromaras et al (2012) 
pointed out, there is a difference between simple persistence and state dependence. 
While simple persistence refers to the duration of an individual being over-educated, 
state dependence is associated with the causal effect of the lagged dependent variable 
of over-education at t-1 on over-education at period t. The nature of the HILDA data 
allows us to control for actual state dependence which arises when the state of being 
over-educated in the previous period has a causal effect on the state of being over-
educated in some future period.   
 
In all models, a highly statistically significant effect of over-education in period t-1 on 
current over-education is observed, confirming the existence of state dependence in 
the Australian labour market. As expected, the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable is larger for immigrants compared to the native sample as shown in Table 4. 
The exogeneity of the initial conditions in the dynamic random effects model is 
rejected by the highly statistically significant coefficient of the initial state of over-
education. This gives support to the use of Wooldridge (2005) estimator. In addition, 
the average mean values for time variant variables are also included to capture any 
correlation of the individual-specific component of the error term with the 
explanatory variables. 
 
Once unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions have been accounted for, the 
results show that those who had been over-educated in the previous period are 10 per 
cent more likely to be over-educated in the future (see Table 3).
16
 Furthermore, the 
results show that immigrants experience a higher degree of state dependence 
compared to natives. That is, 14 per cent of immigrantsÕ over-education at time t can 
be explained by the previous state of over-education, while only 9 per cent of natives 
who have experienced over-education in the previous period are still over-educated at 
time t. However, while 2 per cent of nativeÕs under-education can be explained by the 
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 The existence of state dependence in over-education has been supported by a number of studies (see 




previous state of under-education, the results show that the undereducated immigrants 
do not experience any state dependence. 
5.2 Social capital and over-education 
5.2.1 The PCA index 
When using the PCA index, the marginal effects for the total sample show that social 
capital leads to an increased probability of being over-educated for the native 
population, thus generating a mismatch in the Australian labour market (see Table 3).  
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 report the results obtained for the total male population, 
while columns 3-6 report the incidence of over/under education of natives and 
immigrants respectively. The immigrant sample includes years since the date of 
arrival in Australia, its square, English language proficiency as well as ethnic 
networks (percentage of immigrants living in a region with a high ethnic 
concentration). It is clear that while social capital (PCA index) results in a higher 
incidence of over-education for native females, no significant effect is observed for 
the immigrant sample. Since social capital may have a different impact on over-
education for different ethnic groups, separate regression estimates have been 
conducted distinguishing between different groups of migrants.
17
 However, ethnic 
concentration appears to have a significant and positive effect on female immigrantsÕ 
over-education. In particular, for each percentage point increase in ethnic 
concentration, the incidence of over-education increases by 2 percentage points, 
indicating that interactions with co-ethnics are likely to worsen immigrantsÕ labour 
market outcomes in terms of finding a matched job over time. However, no effect is 
observed for males. These results suggest that females, compared to males, tend to 
rely more on their social contacts and in particular contacts with co-ethnics in order to 
find employment. Perhaps females look for more flexible employment opportunities 
(e.g., because of childcare constraints) and use contacts with other similar females to 
get similar kind of jobs. This is especially so if females are tied migrants, i.e., they 
followed their husbands to the host country, in which case they might be willing to 
take up part-time jobs as it could be that they prefer to spend more time at home with 
																																								 																					
17
 The results of the robustness checks for different groups of migrants are not reported but are 
available upon request.  
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their children. Therefore, they are likely to meet more co-ethnics, for instance by 
participating in organisations dedicated to their own ethnic group, who could perhaps 
help them in finding any part-time or casual job which does not necessarily match 
their education level.  
One explanation for the insignificant effect of the PCA index on the immigrant 
sample could be that it captures mainly social interactions with individuals in the host 
country regardless of ethnicity and region of residence. As outlined by previous 
studies, immigrants are likely to create more contacts with co-ethnics rather than with 
natives as they tend to trust their co-ethnics more than the natives (Glaeser et al., 
2000; Buchan et al., 2002). It could also be that immigrants (especially recent 
arrivals) may not have had the chance yet to form networks with the natives and may 
therefore only rely on social contacts with co-ethnics who are more easily accessible 
upon arrival (e.g., self-selecting themselves into areas with a high percentage of co-
ethnics, or participating in social activities dedicated specifically to their own ethnic 
group). However, no significant effect was found when analysing the results by years 
spent in Australia, indicating that time spent has no impact on network formation as 
the PCA index remains insignificant.
18
 In addition, social contacts do not seem to 
have any effect on the under-education group for both, natives and immigrants. 
5.2.2 Alternative index 
Although the PCA index reduces collinerarity and provides a relatively stable proxy 
for social capital, one drawback is that it does not capture the effect of different 
ÔtypesÕ of social capital as outlined in the literature. It is possible that a particular type 
of social capital may have a stronger or weaker effect on educational mismatch than 
others, which are not captured if it is measured as one single index. Thus, in order to 
analyse the sensitivity of the measurement of social capital on labour market 
outcomes, the models have been re-estimated by constructing an alternative measure, 
which consists of three indices: Ôsocial participationÕ, Ôreciprocity and trustÕ and 
Ôfriends and supportÕ.  
																																								 																					
18
As a robustness check, we have furthermore run separate estimates with social network by 
systematically adding personal and family characteristics, job characteristics and health status in order 
to investigate potential collinearity. Since the social capital index remains unchanged, we can conclude 
that collinearity is not an issue. To conserve space the results from these estimates are not presented in 
this paper but are available upon request. 
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The results indicate that social participation (defined as active participation in clubs, 
associations or trade unions) and friends and support have a statistically significant 
effect on the incidence of over-education for natives when considering the total 
sample as shown in Table 6.  
In particular, social capital acquired through active participation in clubs, associations 
and union membership worsens educational mismatch for native males, while friends 
and support accentuates over-education for native females (see Tables 7 and 8). In 
addition, social participation appears to worsen educational mismatch for female 
immigrants, while no effect is observed for the male sample.   
Although previous studies have found that socialising with friends may play an 
important role in finding employment, the results suggest that they are not very 
effective in finding a correctly matched job. Reciprocity and trust does not seem to 
affect over-education for any group.  
Regarding other human capital indicators, as expected, those with at least a 
BachelorÕs degree are more likely to be over-educated compared to those with lower 
levels of education. Knowledge of the host countryÕs language does not show to have 
any effect on immigrantsÕ incidence of over-education.
19
 However, years spent since 
migration does reduce the incidence of over-education, with a stronger effect on 
female immigrants. These results are in line with previous research, which found that 
years spent in the host country improves immigrantsÕ economic assimilation in the 
host country.
 20
 In addition, tenure with the current occupation reduces the incidence 
of over-education for all groups, with a relatively higher impact on immigrants. 
Perhaps networks could be more effective in reducing educational mismatch once 
immigrants have acquired the relevant experience in that particular occupation. 
 
5.3 Effect of social capital by education level 
Tables 9 and 10 report results by levels of education. Tables 9a (using PCA) and 9b 
(using Alternative Index) report results for male natives and immigrants who have 
																																								 																					
19
 A possible explanation for the insignificant effect of host country language skills might be that 90 
per cent of the immigrant group have been classified as fluent English speakers. 
20	See Chiswick and Miller, 2009	
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completed at least a BachelorÕs degree, while Tables 10a and 10b report the results 
obtained for those with a lower level of education (e.g. diploma or less).  
While the PCA index including all social capital variables becomes insignificant for 
both the higher educated natives and immigrants, interesting results are obtained 
when distinguishing between social participation, friends and support and reciprocity 
and trust. The results indicate that friends and support decrease the incidence of over-
education for male immigrants. In particular, the incidence of over-education for 
higher educated male immigrants decreases by about 3 per cent with friends and 
support. Higher educated are likely to have formed better ÔqualityÕ contacts in the host 
country by creating networks with similarly higher educated individuals. Thus, more 
years in education may provide graduates with a wider network, especially with other 
graduates who are likely to be more informed about (better) job opportunities.   
For the case of natives, however, while friends and support remains insignificant, 
social participation decreases the incidence of over-education for higher educated 
females, indicating the importance of ÔweakÕ ties for female natives with a BachelorÕs 
degree or higher (Granovetter, 1973; Granovetter, 1983; Montgomery 1991). This in 
turn could provide them with information about the labour market and effectively link 
them with employers outside their own network. However, the magnitude of this 
correction is approximately half compared to that for male immigrants. A possible 
explanation could be that if migrants moved to the host country for employment 
reasons, they might put more effort in finding a better matched job in the host 
country.   
Higher educated female immigrants on the other hand do not seem to benefit much 
from their social capital, while ethnic concentration remains significant and positively 
correlated with the incidence of over-education even for the higher educated group. 
Although the significance has reduced, the magnitude has increased compared to the 
total sample (including all levels of education). In other words, higher educated 
females experience higher levels of over-education which is generated by their 
contacts with co-ethnics, increasing the incidence of educational mismatch by nearly 
6 per cent. Regarding the lower educated group shown in Tables 10a and 10b, social 
participation and friends and support are both statistically significant and positively 
affect the incidence of over-education for the native sample for males and females 
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respectively, while no effect is observed for immigrants. The lower educated are 
likely to rely more on their social contacts in order to find employment leading to a 
mismatch in the labour market. Perhaps the lower educated group might have limited 
access to (ÔbetterÕ) networks than those with a university degree. Furthermore, if 
lower educated are not looking to follow a specific occupation pathway then they are 
likely to end up in Ôlower statusÕ jobs which may not necessarily match their 
education level.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to analyse the extent to which social and ethnic capital can 
reduce the problem of over-education for natives and immigrants in the Australian 
labour market. Previous studies have mainly focused on the importance of social 
capital on labour market outcomes in terms of employment entry and wages, but not 
much on the types of jobs individuals enter. Particularly, they do not take into 
consideration whether the jobs individuals find through social capital matches ones 
education qualification. Using longitudinal data from HILDA, this paper examined to 
what extent social capital contributed to reduce or enhance the incidence of 
educational mismatch in the Australian labour market taking into consideration the 
causal effect of social capital. After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and 
addressing potential endogeneity of social networks, the findings suggest that social 
capital exacerbates the incidence of over-education, particularly for females. In 
particular, social capital worsens the incidence of over-education for natives, while 
ethnic capital (defined as ethnic concentration) is the main contributor in increasing 
the probability of over-education for immigrants. These results are in line with a 
number of studies which argue that contacts with co-ethnics might help immigrants in 
finding employment and in some cases increased wages, but are less effective in 
providing them with higher-status jobs (Wiley, 1967; Catanzarite and Aguilera, 
2002). MalesÕ co-ethnic networks on the other hand do not seem to have any impact 
on over-education. 
 Finally, higher educated male immigrants are likely to benefit more from their 
contacts compared to the lower educated group. The results suggest that male 
immigrants with higher education are likely to put more effort in finding a matched 
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job, especially since many of them come to Australia with a job offer. In addition, 
years spent in education may have contributed in creating Ôbetter qualityÕ networks 
with other individuals who might be employed in higher status jobs, enabling them to 
access necessary resources leading to improved labour market conditions.  
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Table 1 Percentage of educational mismatch (Natives and Immigrants) 
  Natives Immigrants Total 
Over-educated 16.76 21.73 17.74 
Under-educated 13.08 9.39 12.35 
Correctly matched 70.16 68.88 69.90 
Total 100 100 100 














Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for employed individuals 





Variables Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Age 38.52 11.97 42.81 11.00 
Married or cohabiting 0.65 0.48 0.72 0.45 
Presence of children aged 14 years or 




Years since migration 
  
24.09 13.68 
Lives in major city 0.62 0.49 0.80 0.40 
Inner 0.25 0.44 0.13 0.33 
Outer 0.11 0.31 0.06 0.23 
Remote 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.11 
ABS unemployment rate in major 
statistical region 
5.13 1.19 4.96 1.13 
Unemployment proportion in last 
financial year 
2.14 10.62 2.08 10.48 
Tenure with current occupation 09.23 09.51 10.12 10.07 
Tenure with current employer 6.98 7.89 6.61 7.12 
Has more than one job 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.27 
BachelorÕs degree or higher 0.28 0.45 0.39 0.49 
Diploma 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.33 
Certificate Level 4 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.34 
Certificate Level 2/3 0.09 0.28 0.05 0.22 
Certificate Level 1 or compulsory 
secondary education 
0.32 0.47 0.26 0.44 
Less than compulsory secondary 
education 
0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17 
Long-term health that condition that 
limits or prevents the type or amount of 
work 













New South Wales 0.28 0.45 0.33 0.47 
Victoria 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.42 
Queensland 0.22 0.42 0.17 0.37 
South Australia 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.25 
Western Australia 0.09 0.28 0.13 0.34 
Tasmania 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.11 
Northern Territory 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.12 
Australian Capital Territory 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.18 
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Social Capital dummies 
Reciprocity and Trust 
    
dhelp 0.82 0.38 0.82 0.38 
dsupport 0.83 0.37 0.80 0.40 
dtrust 0.73 0.44 0.70 0.46 
Friends and Support 
    
dfriends 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.50 
dfreq 0.79 0.41 0.74 0.44 
dcommunity 0.73 0.44 0.73 0.46 
Social Participation 
    
dclub 0.38 0.49 0.33 0.47 
dunion 0.29 0.46 0.27 0.45 
Ethnic concentration (%)  
          5.51              
4.23 
Observations       45,543        11,183 

















Table 3 Dynamic Random Effects Probit model Natives vs. Immigrants- PCA 
Index (Marginal Effects) 
!! !! !! !! !! !! !!
Dynamic Random Effects Probit Model 
  All 
 
















0.100*** 0.0182*** 0.0905*** 0.0216*** 0.137*** 0.00571 
 




0.489*** 0.155*** 0.466*** 0.165*** 0.550*** 0.0928** 
 
(0.0220) (0.0211) (0.0246) (0.0234) (0.0488) (0.0400) 
Immigrant 0.00862** -0.00380**     
 
(0.0041) (0.0019) 
    
Female 0.00245 0.000273 -0.00105 0.000352 0.0237** -0.000163 
 
(0.0029) (0.0015) (0.0030) (0.0019) (0.0095) (0.0015) 
Married or 
cohabiting 
-0.00591 0.00073 -0.00457 0.00148 -0.0139 -0.00165 
 
(0.0044) (0.0020) (0.0043) (0.0025) (0.0156) (0.0026) 
Presence of children 
(<15 years) 
0.000791 -0.000943 0.000188 -0.000799 0.00421 -0.000828 
 
(0.0033) (0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0112) (0.0018) 
YSM     
-0.00262** -0.000243 
 
    
(0.0012) (0.0003) 
YSM squared/100     
2.38E-05 7.32E-06 
 
    
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
English Proficiency     
-0.0179 0.00222 
 
    
(0.0146) (0.0021) 
Education level: 





















0.000194** 0.000443 7.95E-05 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) 











(0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0016) 






-0.000341 -0.00131 9.61E-05 
 
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0002) 
Has more than one 
job 




(0.0050) (0.0021) (0.0049) (0.0026) (0.0180) (0.0020) 
Long-term health 
condition 
0.0160*** -0.00318 0.0162*** -0.00400* 0.0109 -0.000287 
 
(0.0053) (0.0019) (0.0056) (0.0024) (0.0144) (0.0023) 
Social Capital Index 
(PCA) t-1 
0.00138 -0.000246 0.00184* -0.000637 -0.00153 0.000526 
 
(0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0029) (0.0006) 
Ethnic 
Concentration  (%) 
t-1 
    
0.0130** -0.00225 
 




-0.00015 0.000511 -0.000802 0.000245 0.00470* 0.000914 
 




0.000594 0.00051 0.000589 0.000359 -0.000767 0.000332 
 




-0.00211* 0.000584 -0.00162 0.000829 -0.00375 0.000256 
 
(0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0037) (0.0006) 
Interaction 
year*Tasmania 
-0.00172 0.000363 -0.00135 0.000146 -0.00596 0.000726 
 




-0.00708* -0.00167 -0.00655 -0.00215 -0.00917 -0.000292 
 




-0.00308 -0.00083 -0.00336 -0.000715 3.47E-06 -0.00113 




















Observations 41,830 28,490 33,490 23,482 8,340 5,008 
Number of id 9,142 6,569 7,251 5,368 1,891 1,201 
Notes: All models include year dummies, region of residence, age and its square, controls for living in a city, inner 
or remote area, the unemployment rate in major statistical region and Mundlak corrections. The social capital 
index (PCA) includes 8 dummies: active participation in clubs and associations, member of a trade union, frequent 
contacts with friends, having a lot of friends, receiving help from others, feeling part of the local community, does 

















Table 4 Dynamic Random Effects Probit model Natives vs. Immigrants- PCA 
Index (Marginal Effects) Males 
  














:/IJ  0.0889*** 0.0203* 0.0754*** 0.0236* 0.148*** 0.00508 
 
(0.0142) (0.0114) (0.0139) (0.0135) (0.0492) (0.0072) 
:-6-/-5^ 0.495*** 0.138*** 0.490*** 0.160*** 0.494*** 0.0382 
 
(0.0311) (0.0261) (0.0344) (0.0302) (0.0737) (0.0273) 
Immigrant 0.00174 -0.00148 
    
 
(0.0049) (0.0026) 
    
Married or cohabiting -5.94E-05 0.00468 -0.000715 0.00529 0.00527 0.000796 
 
(0.0053) (0.0030) (0.0053) (0.0038) (0.0153) (0.0019) 
Presence of children 
(<15 years) -0.00452 -0.000595 -0.00395 -8.64E-05 -0.0101 -0.000783 
 
(0.0041) (0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0031) (0.0127) (0.0024) 
YSM 
    
0.000228 -0.000352 
     
(0.0015) (0.0004) 
YSM squared/100 
    
-1.20E-05 1.05E-05 
     
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
English Proficiency 
    
-0.0382* 0.00224 
     
(0.0226) (0.0026) 
Education level: 













 Proportion of 0 
unemployment in last 
financial year 0.000494*** 0.000199* 0.000574*** 0.000211* 0.000303 6.00E-05 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) 











(0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0003) (0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0015) 
Tenure with current 
employer -0.00118*** -0.000148 -0.00121*** -0.000279 -0.00104 0.00013 
 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0003) 
Has more than one 
job 0.00769 -0.000463 0.00521 -0.000279 0.0194 -0.000728 
 
(0.0072) (0.0030) (0.0071) (0.0038) (0.0235) (0.0021) 
Long-term health 
condition 0.0106 -0.00361 0.0101 -0.00691* 0.00546 0.0113 
 
(0.0068) (0.0028) (0.0070) (0.0038) (0.0177) (0.0145) 
Social Capital Index 
(PCA) t-1 0.000745 -0.000618 0.00173 -0.000823 -0.00374 0.000186 
 





    
0.00797 -0.00237 
     
(0.0072) (0.0022) 
Interaction 
year*Queensland -0.000118 0.000557 -0.00096 0.000281 0.00646* 0.000852 
 
(0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0035) (0.0010) 
Interaction 
year*South Australia 0.00146 8.36E-05 0.00135 3.25E-05 0.0025 -0.000222 
 
(0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0055) (0.0008) 
Interaction 
year*Western 
Australia -0.000341 0.000203 6.85E-05 0.000711 -5.12E-06 -0.000293 
 
(0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0044) (0.0007) 
Interaction 
year*Tasmania 0.000292 -0.000467 -0.00044 -0.00132 0.0134 0.00215 
 
(0.0033) (0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0020) (0.0159) (0.0023) 
Interaction 
year*Northern 
Territory -0.00618 -0.00428 -0.00572 -0.00467 -0.0283** -0.0023 
 
(0.0071) (0.0033) (0.0069) (0.0039) (0.0144) (0.0024) 
Interaction 
year*Australian 
Capital Territory -0.00354 -0.00234 -0.00481 -0.00324 0.00404 -0.000155 
  (0.0026) (0.0015) (0.0030) (0.0021) (0.0046) (0.0008) 
Log likelihood -5393.1832 -4205.2462 -4268.852 -3526.5581 -1090.9154 -637.04256 
Observations 20,969 14,809 16,682 12,206 4,287 2603 
Number of id 4,509 3,350 3,543 2,732 966 618 
Notes: All models include year dummies, region of residence, age and its square, controls for living in a city, inner or remote 
area, the unemployment rate in major statistical region and Mundlak corrections. The social capital index (PCA) includes 8 
dummies: active participation in clubs and associations, member of a trade union, frequent contacts with friends, having a lot of 
friends, receiving help from others, feeling part of the local community, does not feel lonely and does have someone to lean on in 
times of trouble. The ethnic concentration variable has been capture using 13 ethnic groups residing in the 8 states of Australia. 


























Table 5 Dynamic Random Effects Probit model Natives vs. Immigrants- PCA 
Index (Marginal Effects) Females 
!! !! !! !! !! !! !!
Dynamic Random Effects Probit model 














:/IJ 0.110*** 0.0154** 0.103*** 0.0190** 0.129*** 0.000428 
 
(0.0158) (0.0066) (0.0172) (0.0081) (0.0375) (0.0012) 
:-6-/-5^ 0.470*** 0.176*** 0.429*** 0.167*** 0.597*** 0.196 
 
(0.0309) (0.0349) (0.0345) (0.0361) (0.0656) (0.1220) 
Immigrant 0.0170** -0.00582** 
    
 
(0.0068) (0.0027) 
    Married or 
cohabiting -0.00975 -0.00419 -0.0059 -0.00366 -0.0392 -0.00111 
 
(0.0068) (0.0034) (0.0064) (0.0041) (0.0306) (0.0020) 
Presence of 
children (<15 
years) 0.00781 -0.00263 0.00576 -0.00305 0.0192 -0.0004 
 
(0.0054) (0.0026) (0.0052) (0.0034) (0.0193) (0.0008) 
YSM 
    
-
0.00614*** -1.50E-05 
     
(0.0021) (0.0001) 
YSM squared/100 
    
7.17e-05** 5.05E-07 
     
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
English Proficiency 
    
-0.00095 0.00049 
















 Proportion of 
unemployment in 
last financial year 0.000602*** 0.000155** 0.000575*** 0.000180* 0.000611 1.82E-05 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0000) 





0.00790*** -0.00116 -0.00068 
 
(0.0003) (0.0015) (0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Tenure with current 
employer -0.000263 -0.000258 6.83E-06 -0.000381 -0.00226 -1.96E-05 
 
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0015) (0.0001) 
Has more than one 
job 0.0145** 8.69E-05 0.0134** 0.000572 0.0175 -0.000293 
 
(0.0067) (0.0028) (0.0064) (0.0037) (0.0258) (0.0006) 
Long-term health 
condition 0.0210*** -0.00306 0.0210** -0.000606 0.0173 -0.000867 
 
(0.0079) (0.0026) (0.0083) (0.0038) (0.0223) (0.0014) 
Social Capital 
Index (PCA) t-1 0.00192 0.000175 0.00187* -0.000325 0.00181 0.000246 
 




    
0.0219** -0.000441 





year*Queensland -0.000296 0.000369 -0.000654 7.67E-05 0.000489 0.000229 
 
(0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0044) (0.0004) 
Interaction 
year*South 
Australia -0.000317 0.000947 -0.000102 0.000695 -0.00316 0.000226 
 
(0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0062) (0.0004) 
Interaction 
year*Western 
Australia -0.00420** 0.00107 -0.00350* 0.000997 -0.0086 0.000179 
 
(0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0060) (0.0003) 
Interaction 
year*Tasmania -0.00378 0.00112 -0.00237 0.0016 -0.0215*** 0.000123 
 
(0.0030) (0.0015) (0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0073) (0.0004) 
Interaction 
year*Northern 
Territory -0.00937** 0.000564 -0.00822 0.0011 -0.0138 0.000217 
 
(0.0046) (0.0029) (0.0055) (0.0050) (0.0101) (0.0005) 
Interaction 
year*Australian 
Capital Territory -0.00158 0.00026 -0.00114 0.00104 -0.00441 -0.000886 
  (0.0033) (0.0014) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0080) (0.0014) 
Log likelihood -5608.7547 -4114.0905 -4432.0033 -3458.5767 -1143.4858 -624.1779 
Observations 20,861 13,681 16,808 11,276 4,053 2,405 
Number of id 4,633 3,219 3,708 2,636 925 583 
Notes: All models include year dummies, region of residence, age and its square, controls for living in a city, inner 
or remote area, the unemployment rate in major statistical region and Mundlak corrections. The social capital 
index Ôsocial participationÕ includes active participation of clubs and associations and member of a trade union, the 
index Ôfriends and supportÕ includes frequent contacts with friends, having a lot of friends and receiving help from 
others and the index Ôreciprocity and trustÕ includes feeling part of the local community, does not feel lonely and 




























Table 6 Dynamic Random Effects Probit model Natives vs. Immigrants Ð Alternative 
Index (Marginal Effects)  
 
!! !! !! !! !! !! !!
Dynamic Random Effects Probit model 
  All   Natives   Immigrants   











:/IJ 0.101*** 0.0186*** 0.0916*** 0.0220*** 0.137*** 0.00574 
 
(0.0107) (0.0065) (0.0112) (0.0080) (0.0297) (0.0064) 
:-6-/-5^ 0.487*** 0.156*** 0.463*** 0.165*** 0.557*** 0.0935** 
 
(0.0220) (0.0208) (0.0245) (0.0231) (0.0490) (0.0400) 
Immigrant 0.00833** -0.00390**     
 
(0.0041) (0.0019) 
    
Female 0.000639 -0.00171 -0.0022 -0.00215 0.0184** -0.000631 
 
(0.0029) (0.0016) (0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0092) (0.0015) 
Married or 
cohabiting 
-0.00544 0.000794 -0.00413 0.00156 -0.0132 -0.00149 
 




0.000895 -0.000791 0.000225 -0.000587 0.0046 -0.000785 
 
(0.0033) (0.0018) (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0110) (0.0018) 
YSM     
-0.00251** -0.000216 
 




    
2.27E-05 6.86E-06 
 




    
-0.0137 0.00239 
 






















































-0.000346 -0.00146 8.84E-05 
 
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0002) 
Has more than 
one job 
0.0111** -0.000406 0.00963** -0.000302 0.0182 -0.000293 
 





0.0162*** -0.00302 0.0163*** -0.00386 0.0107 -0.000193 
 
(0.0054) (0.0019) (0.0057) (0.0024) (0.0142) (0.0023) 
SCI: Social 
Participation t-1 
0.00577*** -0.000715 0.00470** -0.00113 0.0123* 0.000393 
 
(0.0020) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0065) (0.0011) 
SCI: Friends and 
Support t-1 
0.00217 0.000636 0.00307** 0.000919 -0.0042 -0.000162 
 
(0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0041) (0.0006) 
SCI: Reciprocity 
and Trust t-1 
-9.71E-05 -0.000689 0.00017 -0.00138 -0.00127 0.000827 
 




    
0.0132** -0.00214 
 





-0.000175 0.000521 -0.000819 0.000266 0.00453* 0.000907 
 




0.000564 0.000512 0.000543 0.000367 -0.000551 0.000335 
 




-0.00210* 0.000621 -0.00166 0.000877 -0.00346 0.000251 
 
-0.00122 -0.000648 -0.00126 -0.000831 -0.00358 -0.000636 
Interaction 
year*Tasmania 
-0.00179 0.000381 -0.00142 0.000189 -0.00596 0.000653 
 




-0.00705* -0.00156 -0.00652 -0.00204 -0.00906 -0.000201 
 




-0.00308 -0.000896 -0.00341 -0.000798 0.000194 -0.00112 
  -0.00206 -0.000969 -0.0023 -0.0012 -0.00428 -0.00113 
Log likelihood 




Observations 41,830 28,490 33,490 23,482 8,340 5,008 
Number of id 9,142 6,569 7,251 5,368 1,891 1,201 
Notes: All models include year dummies, region of residence, age and its square, controls for living in a city, inner or remote 
area, the unemployment rate in major statistical region and Mundlak corrections. The social capital index Ôsocial participationÕ 
includes active participation of clubs and associations and member of a trade union, the index Ôfriends and support includes 
frequent contacts with friends, having a lot of friends and receiving help from others and the index Ôreciprocity and trustÕ 
includes feeling part of the local community, does not feel lonely and does have someone to lean on in times of trouble. The 











Table 7 Dynamic Random Effects Probit model Natives vs. Immigrants Ð Alternative 
Index (Marginal Effects) Males 
 
Dynamic Random Effects Probit model 














:/IJ 0.0894*** 0.0203* 0.0761*** 0.0237* 0.146*** 0.00432 
 
(0.0142) (0.0112) (0.0140) (0.0131) (0.0483) (0.0064) 
:-6-/-5^ 0.495*** 0.136*** 0.491*** 0.158*** 0.499*** 0.0373 
 
(0.0311) (0.0256) (0.0344) (0.0294) (0.0737) (0.0275) 
Immigrant 0.00187 -0.00195 
    
 
(0.0049) (0.0025) 
    Married or 
cohabiting 0.000148 0.00482 -0.000278 0.00557 0.00484 0.000733 
 
(0.0052) (0.0030) (0.0053) (0.0037) (0.0150) (0.0017) 
Presence of 
children (<15 
years) -0.00435 -0.000621 -0.00376 -6.32E-05 -0.011 -0.000801 
 
(0.0041) (0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0031) (0.0125) (0.0021) 
YSM 
    
0.000298 -0.000293 
     
(0.0014) (0.0003) 
YSM squared/100 
    
-1.28E-05 9.22E-06 




    
-0.0351 0.00202 
















 Proportion of 
unemployment in 
last financial year 0.000498*** 0.000197** 0.000576*** 0.000212* 0.000278 5.37E-05 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) 
Tenure with 










(0.0003) (0.0015) (0.0003) (0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0015) 
Tenure with 
current employer -0.00123*** -0.000138 -0.00127*** -0.000263 -0.00103 0.000119 
 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0002) 
Has more than one 
job 0.00723 -0.000625 0.00495 -0.000611 0.018 -0.000515 
 
(0.0071) (0.0029) (0.0070) (0.0037) (0.0227) (0.0020) 
Long-term health 
condition 0.0107 -0.00344 0.00998 -0.00672* 0.00525 0.0106 
 
(0.0068) (0.0028) (0.0070) (0.0036) (0.0176) (0.0140) 
SCI: Social 
Participation t-1 0.00654** -0.00174 0.00721** -0.00218 0.00325 -0.000229 
 (0.0028) (0.0016) (0.0029) (0.0020) (0.0080) (0.0012) 
40	
	
SCI: Friends and 
Support t-1 
0.00053 0.000597 0.00239 0.00158 -0.00877* -0.000967 
 
(0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0052) (0.0011) 
SCI: Reciprocity 
and Trust t-1 -5.65E-05 -0.00108 0.00013 -0.00186 -0.000521 0.00084 




    
0.00797 -0.00216 
     
(0.0072) (0.0021) 
Interaction 
year*Queensland -0.00013 0.000545 -0.00095 0.000258 0.00647* 0.000816 
 
-0.00108 -0.000618 -0.00109 -0.000723 -0.00343 -0.000981 
Interaction 
year*South 
Australia 0.00147 7.39E-05 0.00132 2.58E-05 0.00238 -0.00014 
 
-0.00147 -0.00088 -0.00143 -0.00108 -0.00541 -0.000723 
Interaction 
year*Western 
Australia -0.000311 0.000244 7.04E-05 0.000758 0.000301 -0.000222 
 
-0.00156 -0.00081 -0.0016 -0.00105 -0.00432 -0.000618 
Interaction 
year*Tasmania 0.000273 -0.000443 -0.000502 -0.00129 0.0132 0.00194 
 
-0.00324 -0.00165 -0.00307 -0.00203 -0.0153 -0.00211 
Interaction 
year*Northern 
Territory -0.00609 -0.00413 -0.0056 -0.00442 -0.0278** -0.00211 
 
-0.00704 -0.00316 -0.00686 -0.00381 -0.014 -0.00227 
Interaction 
year*Australian 
Capital Territory -0.00352 -0.00241 -0.00485* -0.00329 0.00388 -0.000137 
  -0.00256 -0.00151 -0.00295 -0.00205 -0.00452 -0.000716 
Log likelihood -5390.2741 -4192.1274 -4264.724 -3512.5017 -1088.4682 -634.41303 
Observations 20,969 14,809 16,682 12,206 4,287 2,603 
Number of id 4,509 3,350 3,543 2,732 966 618 
Notes: All models include year dummies, region of residence, age and its square, controls for living in a city, inner or remote 
area, the unemployment rate in major statistical region and Mundlak corrections. The social capital index Ôsocial participationÕ 
includes active participation of clubs and associations and member of a trade union, the index Ôfriends and support includes 
frequent contacts with friends, having a lot of friends and receiving help from others and the index Ôreciprocity and trustÕ 
includes feeling part of the local community, does not feel lonely and does have someone to lean on in times of trouble. The 
















Table 8 Dynamic Random Effects Probit model Natives vs. Immigrants Ð Alternative 
Index (Marginal Effects) Females 
 
!! !! !! !! !! !! !!
Dynamic Random Effects Probit model 
  All Natives Immigrants 











:/IJ 0.112*** 0.0160** 0.104*** 0.0196** 0.129*** 0.000395 
 
(0.0160) (0.0068) (0.0174) (0.0083) (0.0382) (0.0011) 
:-6-/-5^ 
0.467*** 0.178*** 0.426*** 0.169*** 0.608*** 0.203* 
 
(0.0307) (0.0346) (0.0343) (0.0359) (0.0656) (0.1240) 
Immigrant 0.0166** -0.00566**     
 
(0.0067) (0.0026) 
    
Married or 
cohabiting 
-0.00928 -0.00423 -0.00571 -0.00384 -0.0352 -0.000919 
 




0.00809 -0.00234 0.00599 -0.00271 0.0202 -0.000346 
 
(0.0054) (0.0026) (0.0052) (0.0033) (0.0192) (0.0007) 





    
(0.0020) (0.0001) 
YSM 
squared/100     
6.79e-05** 3.92E-07 
 
    
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
English 
Proficiency     
0.00394 0.000475 
 




















in last financial 
year 
0.000595*** 0.000148* 0.000571*** 0.000172* 0.000588 1.60E-05 
 












(0.0003) (0.0014) (0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0009) 
Tenure with 
current employer 
-0.000347 -0.000294 -2.95E-05 -0.000418 -0.00269* -2.37E-05 
 
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0001) 
Has more than 
one job 
0.0139** -0.00022 0.0130** 0.00024 0.0158 -0.000299 
 
(0.0067) (0.0028) (0.0064) (0.0036) (0.0252) (0.0006) 
Long-term 
health condition 
0.0213*** -0.00293 0.0211** -0.000447 0.0173 -0.000774 
 
(0.0080) (0.0026) (0.0083) (0.0038) (0.0224) (0.0013) 
SCI: Social 
Participation t-1 




(0.0029) (0.0016) (0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0105) (0.0005) 
SCI: Friends and 
Support t-1 
0.00386* 0.00057 0.00375* 7.38E-05 0.00144 0.000275 
 
(0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0067) (0.0005) 
SCI: Reciprocity 
and Trust t-1 
-0.000237 -0.00011 0.000188 -0.000517 -0.00142 0.00014 
 




    
0.0205** -0.000394 
 




-0.000312 0.000397 -0.000652 0.000138 0.000197 0.000192 
 




-0.000372 0.000948 -0.000129 0.000688 -0.00284 0.000206 
 




-0.00417** 0.0011 -0.00355* 0.00106 -0.00809 0.00015 
 
(0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0059) (0.0003) 
Interaction 
year*Tasmania 
-0.00379 0.00112 -0.00233 0.00161 -0.0218*** 0.000109 
 




-0.00934** 0.00067 -0.00824 0.00115 -0.0142 0.000215 
 




-0.0017 0.000229 -0.00127 0.00101 -0.00399 -0.00078 














Observations 20,861 13,681 16,808 11,276 4,053 2,405 
Number of id 4,633 3,219 3,708 2,636 925 583 
 Notes: All models include year dummies, region of residence, age and its square, controls for living in a city, inner or remote area, the 
unemployment rate in major statistical region and Mundlak corrections. The social capital index Ôsocial participationÕ includes active 
participation of clubs and associations and member of a trade union, the index Ôfriends and support includes frequent contacts with 
friends, having a lot of friends and receiving help from others and the index Ôreciprocity and trustÕ includes feeling part of the local 
community, does not feel lonely and does have someone to lean on in times of trouble. The ethnic concentration variable has been 



















Table 9 Dynamic Random Effects Probit model Ð BachelorÕs Degree or higher 
(Marginal Effects)  
Table 9a         
Social Capital Index (PCA) Having a BachelorÕs degree or higher 
 





Males Females Males Females 
:/IJ 0.102*** 0.104*** 0.233*** 0.248*** 
 
(0.0253) (0.0239) (0.0707) (0.0513) 
:-6-/-5^ 0.356*** 0.333*** 0.399*** 0.351*** 
 
(0.0463) (0.0483) (0.0991) (0.0752) 
Social Capital Index (PCA) 
t-1  0.00109 -0.0025 -0.0114 0.0202 
 
(0.00576) (0.00432) (0.0101) (0.0138) 




    (0.0222) (0.0321) 
Observations 4,471 5,520 1,682 1,645 
Number of id 851 1,130 353 358 
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Table 9b         
Social Capital - Alternative Index Having a BachelorÕs degree or higher 
 
        Natives 
 
        Immigrants 
 
 
Males Females Males Females 
:/IJ 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.231*** 0.254*** 
 
(0.0253) (0.0239) (0.0688) (0.0525) 
:-6-/-5^ 0.357*** 0.312*** 0.406*** 0.353*** 
 
(0.0466) (0.0468) (0.0991) (0.0756) 
Social Participation t-1 0.00791 -0.0137* -0.0048 0.0502* 
 
(0.0098) (0.00703) (0.02) (0.029) 
Friends and Support t-1 -0.00365 0.00236 -0.0279* 0.0107 
 
(0.00809) (0.00568) (0.0144) (0.0203) 
Reciprocity and Trust t-1 0.00129 -0.00362 0.000235 0.0129 
 
(0.00782) (0.0058) (0.0124) (0.0196) 




    (0.0214) (0.0323) 
Observations 4,471 5,520 1,682 1,645 
Number of id 851 1,130 353 358 
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Notes: Both Tables include year dummies, Mundlak corrections and the same control variables as  





Table 10 Dynamic Random Effects Probit model Ð Less than a BachelorÕs degree 
(Marginal Effects)  
Table 10a         
Social Capital Index (PCA)  Education less than a BachelorÕs degree  
VARIABLES Natives Immigrants 
 
Males Females Males Females 
:/IJ 0.0463*** 0.0834*** 0.0659 0.0153 
 
(0.0137) (0.0223) (0.057) (0.0164) 
:-6-/-5^ 0.601*** 0.512*** 0.563*** 0.825*** 
 
(0.0464) (0.0498) (0.114) (0.0829) 
Social Capital Index (PCA)  t-1 0.00119 0.00215* 0.000403 -0.00131 
 
(0.00086) (0.00115) (0.0019) (0.00142) 
Ethnic Concentration (%) t-1   0.00783 -0.00097 
    (0.00648) (0.0024) 
Observations 12,211 11,288 2,605 2,408 
Number of id 2,734 2,639 619 583 
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Table 10b         
Social Capital - Alternative Index Education less than a BachelorÕs degree 
VARIABLES Natives Immigrants 
 
Males Females Males Females 
:/IJ 0.0474*** 0.0852*** 0.0625 0.0153 
 
(0.0139) (0.0226) (0.0545) (0.0165) 
:-6-/-5^ 0.602*** 0.513*** 0.574*** 0.836*** 
 
(0.0462) (0.0495) (0.115) (0.0802) 
Social Participation t-1 0.00412** 0.00477** 0.0146 0.0034 
 
(0.00207) (0.00239) (0.00544) (0.00274) 
Friends and Support t-1 0.00216* 0.00330** -0.00525 -0.00324 
 
(0.00129) (0.00166) (0.00142) (0.00063) 
Reciprocity and Trust t-1 0.000141 0.000603 -0.00269 -0.0017 
 
(0.00116) (0.00146) (0.00089) (0.00175) 
Ethnic Concentration (%) t-1   -0.00254 -0.00176 
    (0.00793) (0.00107) 
Observations 12,211 11,288 2,605 2,408 
Number of id 2,734 2,639 619 583 
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Notes: Both Tables include year dummies, Mundlak corrections and the same control variables  








Table A1 ANZSCO Ð Occupational breakdown Ð 2digit level and their 
corresponding skill requirements 
    Skill Level(s) 
1 MANAGERS 
 
11 Chief Executives, General Managers and Legislators 1 
12 Farmers and Farm Managers 1 
13 Specialist Managers 1 
14 Hospitality, Retail and Service Managers 2 
2 PROFESSIONALS 
 
21 Arts and Media Professionals 1 
22 Business, Human Resource and Marketing Professionals 1 
23 Design, Engineering, Science and Transport Professionals 1 
24 Education Professionals 1 
25 Health Professionals 1 
26 ICT Professionals 1 
27 Legal, Social and Welfare Professionals 1 
3 TECHNICIANS AND TRADES WORKERS 
 
31 Engineering, ICT and Science Technicians 2 
32 Automotive and Engineering Trades Workers 3 
33 Construction Trades Workers 3 
34 Electrotechnology and Telecommunications Trades Workers 3 
35 Food Trades Workers 2,3 
36 Skilled Animal and Horticultural Workers 3 
39 Other Technicians and Trades Workers 3 
4 
  
41 Health and Welfare Support Workers 2 
42 Carers and Aides 4 
43 Hospitality Workers 4,5 
44 Protective Service Workers 2,3,4,5 
45 Sports and Personal Service Workers 3,4 
5 CLERICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE WORKERS 
 
51 Office Managers and Program Administrators 2 
52 Personal Assistants and Secretaries 3 
53 General Clerical Workers 4 
54 Inquiry Clerks and Receptionists 4 
55 Numerical Clerks 4 
56 Clerical and Office Support Workers 5 
59 Other Clerical and Administrative Workers 3,4 
6 SALES WORKERS 
 
61 Sales Representatives and Agents 3,4 
62 Sales Assistants and Salespersons 5 
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63 Sales Support Workers 5 
7 MACHINERY OPERATORS AND DRIVERS 
 
71 Machine and Stationary Plant Operators 4 
72 Mobile Plant Operators 4 
73 Road and Rail Drivers 4 
74 Store persons 4 
8 LABOURERS 
 
81 Cleaners and Laundry Workers 5 
82 Construction and Mining Labourers 4,5 
83 Factory Process Workers 4,5 
84 Farm, Forestry and Garden Workers 5 
85 Food Preparation Assistants 5 
89 Other Labourers 5 
Source: ANZSCO, Australian Bureau of Statistics, cat. no. 1220 
47	
	
Table A2 ANZSCO Definition of skill levels Ð Required formal education and 
years of relevant experience  
Skill Level 
1 
Bachelor degree or higher qualification (At least five years of relevant experience required to 
substitute for formal qualification) 
2 
NZ Register Diploma or AQF Associate Degree, Advanced Diploma or Diploma (At least three 
years of relevant experience required to substitute formal qualification) 
3 
NZ Register Level 4 qualification or AQF Certificate IV or AQF Certificate III including at 
least two years of on-the-job training (At least three years of relevant experience required to 
substitute for formal qualification) 
4 
NZ Register Level 2/3 qualification or AQF Certificate II or III (At least one year of relevant 
experience required to substitute formal qualification) 
5 NZ Register Level 1 qualification or AQF Certificate I/compulsory secondary education 
Source:  ANZSCO, Australian Bureau of Statistics, cat. no. 1220.
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Table A3 Social capital variables and definitions  
!! !! !!
Literature or explanation of 
variable 
Question asked in survey (HILDA Self Completion Questionnaire) 
 
I often need help from other people 
but can't get it' 
Strongly disagree=1, Strongly agree=7 
Reciprocity and trust 
I have no one to lean on in times of 
trouble' 
Strongly disagree=1, Strongly agree=7 
!
I often feel very lonely' Strongly disagree=1, Strongly agree=7 
 
I seem to have a lot of friends' Strongly disagree=1, Strongly agree=7 
Friends and support 
How often get together socially with 
friends/relatives not living with you?' 
Every day=1, Several times a week=2, About once
week=3, 2 or 3 times a month=4, About once a 
month=5, Once or twice every 3 months=6, Less o
than once every 3 months=7 
!
Feeling part of your local community' 
Totally dissatisfied=0, Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied=5, totally satisfied=10 
 
Currently an active member of a 




Union membership of employee 
association' 
Yes=1, No=0 
!!   
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A4 Construction of the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a statistical method which aims to 
reduce multicollinearity by using an orthogonal transformation to transform a set of 
explanatory variables into a set of principal components, which are uncorrelated one 
another. By that, it reduces the dimensionality of the data keeping as much of the 
variation as possible. Thus, the first principal component of the set of variables 
chosen has the largest variation available in the data. The following tables report the 
results obtained using 8 variables related to social capital in order to construct the 
PCA index. 
Table A4 Pearson Correlation Coefficients between the social capital variables  
Correlation coefficients between social capital variables 
 
dhelp dsupport dtrust dfriends dfreq dcommunity dclub dunion 
dhelp 1 
       
dsupport 0.3405 1 
      
dtrust 0.3153 0.3589 1 
     
dfriends 0.1707 0.1989 0.211 1 
    
dfreq 0.1134 0.1521 0.1126 0.2136 1 
   
dcommunity 0.1311 0.1343 0.1616 0.1647 0.0887 1 
  
dclub 0.0712 0.0729 0.0716 0.1215 0.1113 0.1517 1 
 
dunion 0.0406 0.0286 0.0419 0.0312 -0.0136 0.058 0.0444 1 
 
Table A5 Eigenvalues and Cumulative Proportion  
 
Component Eigenvalue 
Cumulative             
Proportion 
Comp1 2.05525 0.2569 
Comp2 1.09168 0.3934 
Comp3 1.02514 0.5215 
Comp4 0.907117 0.6349 
Comp5 0.842497 0.7402 
Comp6 0.764481 0.8358 
Comp7 0.68223 0.921 






Table A6 Outcomes of the Principal Components (eigenvectors) 
Principal Components (eigenvectors)  at time t 
Variables (t) 
 












dhelp  (-#$) 0.4376 -0.3351 0.0854 -0.0822 0.1955 0.1273 0.7586 0.2284 
dsupport  (-%$) 0.4679 -0.3229 0.0049 -0.0179 0.1507 0.0889 -0.2376 -0.7677 
dtrust  (-&$) 0.4618 -0.2989 0.0837 -0.0966 0.0113 -0.1017 -0.5786 0.5795 
dfriends (-'$) 0.3843 0.2325 -0.2012 0.2817 -0.3243 -0.7361 0.1626 -0.0707 
dfreq  (-($) 0.2885 0.3035 -0.4759 0.536 0.04 0.5397 -0.058 0.1209 
dcommunity  
(-)$) 0.3043 0.3663 0.1951 -0.4701 -0.6318 0.3329 0.0363 -0.0532 
dclub  (-*$) 0.215 0.618 0.0457 -0.3433 0.6571 -0.1356 -0.0415 0.0055 
dunion 9 (-+$) 0.0814 0.1782 0.8237 0.5273 0.0348 0.0573 -0.0185 -0.0132 
Notes: dhelp presents Ôreceiving help from othersÕ, dsupport presents Ôhaving someone to lean onÕ, 
dtrust presents Ôdoes not feel lonelyÕ, dfriends presents Ôhaving a lot of friendsÕ, dfreq presents 
Ôfrequent contactsÕ, dcommunity presents Ôfeeling part of the local communityÕ, dclub presents Ôactive 
member of a club or associationÕ and dunion presents Ôunion membershipÕ. 
 
Table A4 shows the correlation between the variables used in the PCA, which verifies 
that the components of the PCA are sufficiently different from one another to relate to 
various dimensions of social capital. The eigenvalues and the cumulative proportion 
as shown in Table A5 indicate the variation that is accounted for from the 8 variables 
chosen. As we can see, the first component accounts for 26 per cent of the variation in 
the data. Since this is relatively low, a number of other variables should be chosen. 
Although there is no consensus on how many and which components should be 
considered, it is argued that those components with eigenvalues greater than one have 
a larger variation than the variance of the individual standardized -.$  variables 
(Manly, 2004).  The first three components seem to be more important as they seem 
to have a larger variation and are all greater than one. 
Table A6 reports the eigenvectors obtained which present the coefficients of the 
principal components at time t.
21
 It is noticeable that the !"%$  and !"&$  seem to 
contain more relevant information where the !"%$ is led by dcommunity and dclub 
(coefficients -)$	and -*$	), while !"&$ is led by dunion (coefficient	-+$	). In order to 
investigate which principal component is most suitable for the analysis and whether 
																																								 																					
21
 Note that this presents the principal components taken as an average over the 11 year period to 
illustrate an example on how the PCA index was created. In order to construct the PCA variable for the 
analysis, the principal components of each year have been captured and merged in order to capture 
each variation in the data for every wave, rather than the average. 
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!"%$  and !"&$  are more relevant, the regressions have been re-estimated using all 
three components as well as each of the three at a time. However, since no effect is 
observed, the analysis has been conducted using the first principal component. 
The first principal component used as a proxy for social capital can be represented as 
the following regression: 
!"#$=0.4376-#$ + 0.4679-%$ + 0.4618-&$ + 0.3843-'$ + 0.2885 -($+ 0.3043-)$+ 
0.215-*$ + 0.0814-+$, 
where the first principal component !"#$ is a function of 8 eigenvectors (its 
coefficients). 
	
